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In the study of the law of agency, of the many sub-
jects discussed, an important and very interesting one,
is that which I have taken as the basis of this article,
and which is expressed by the maxim, "potestas delegata
non potest delegare."
To state the general rule relating to this subject,
one has merely to repeat the maxim just given. No dif-
ficulties arise when there is an attempt to express this
rule; but its application to the numerous cases which
have arisen, has been a matter of discussion throughout
the country. And where the rule has been applied va-
rious reasons are given for its application.
There is no doubt arising from the well known prin-
ciple that, "one acting under delegated authority, cannot
himself delegate that authority to another." An agent
may have the most ample power to bind his principal by
his acts and determinations, respecting the subject of
the agency, but this of itself gives him no authority to
delegate those powers to another.
The authority to delegate the power with which an
agent is intrusted,ought not, in the absence of words
conferring express authority, or from which such an au-
thority may be inferred, to be presumed. Upon this
subject the principles of the early writers are identi-
cal in substance, with the principles of the writers of
the present day; and may be traced to the same general
principle, that "an authority to delegate a delegated
authority will not be presunmed. In the absence of ex-
press authority the presumption is that the agent has
no such power.
The appointment of an agent in a particular case is,
as a rule, made because of some fitness which his prin-
cipal believes him to possess, and by reason of which he
is better qualified to carry out the purposes for which
he is appointed. When the performance of the agency
requires the exercise of special skill, judgment or dis-
cretion, on the part of the agent, the general rule,
previously stated, is particularly applicable, for the
reason that the authority is purely personal, the prin-
cipal placing more than ordinary confidence in the skill
and judgment of the person whom he appoints as his agent,
and are not capable of delegation.
The rule, potestas delegata non potest delegare, is,
however, subject to certain exceptions which grow out of
the circumstances of each case, and create an implied
authority to employ a subagent. These exceptions will
come up for consideration after the general rule has
been discussed and applied.
The general rule has not been comfined to that
class of persons who, strictly speaking, are known as
agents, but from an early period of our law has been laid
down, as to powers, to sell land, make leases,etc., given
by will or deed to executors, trustees and attorneys.
The courts of the present time have extended the princi-
ple to the loss formal appointments of factors, brokers,
and other commercial agents, and to corporations, both
municiple and private.
In treating the rule as applied in this broader
sense, I have thought it best to take each class and
deal with it separately.
Before entering upon this, it is well to understand
the distinction between acts and duties which are minis-
terial and those which are judicial. Ministerial acts
and duties are those which are definitely fixed and as-
certained. Acts and duties are judicial when they re-
quire the exercise of judgment and discretion.
Chase's Blackstone, note, p. 102.
As to those persons who are known strictly as agents
little need be said as the general rule and previous
discussion apply with particular force to that class.
An interesting question, however, came up in the
case of Lyons v. Jerome 26 Wend. 485, as to how far the
reason and policy of the rule applied to the delegation
of power by the State to its high public officers, made
by legislative act, A statute gave to canal conmission-
t ake
ers power toAproperty for the construction and repair of
the canals. The defendant was Chief Engineer of im-
provements of a lock, on the Oswego Canal; and in that
capacityentered a quarry belonging to.the plaintiffs
and took therefrom a quantity of stone to use in the
repairing of the lock. The opinion written by Senator
Verplank, was the opinion of the majority. The Senator
says:
"The statute as well as the nature of the trust it-
self, shows that this is an authority confided to the
judgment and discretion of the conmissioners themselves,
for the impartial discharge of which they are responsible
to the State. The person thus entrusted may have occa-
sion to depend on scientific and professional advice for
the guidance of his own judgment; he may even, in matters
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not out of the scope of his own information, rely upon
the authority of his own advisors; yet he is still bound
to form a judgment for himself, and to resume its respon-
sibilities. In this case there was no exercise of judg-
ment or discretion whatever by the commissioners; there
was merely such a reliance on the supervision and judgr-
ment of the engineer, as might amount to an implied del-
egation of authority, had the commissioners been author
ized to make such a delegation. I have only to add that
it is the greatest public importance to establish the
general rule of agency that "delegated authority cannot
be delegated again without special power to do so", as
governing the officials, powers, acts and contracts of
our state officers." This case was followed in 58 N.Y.
461.
A general agent cannot submit a cause to arbitration
unless he has special authority to do so. If, however,
the agent is appointed to institute legal proceedings,
he may bind his principal by a submission to arbitration.
The reason for allowing the agent to thus bind his prin-
cipal is, that an authority to prosecute or defend a suit
implies a power to refer the subjeet, by rule of court,
that being a mode of compromising suits.
As a rule, the services of an attorney are procured
because of his personal skill and learning, and when he
is employed to argue and conduct a cause, there comes
into existence a personal trust; he cannot, therefore,
without the consent of his principal, entrust the per-
formance of this duty to another; or let the case out on
shares. Clerks and assistants may, nevertheless, be
employed to perform the merely ministerial and mechani-
cal duties.
The right of an attorney to submit his clients cause
to arbitration is a question over which there has been
a difference of opinion.
The attorney's authority and duty in the conduct of
a cause clothe him with all the powers necessary for the
proper discharge of that duty, according to the forms
and usages of the court in which the cause is pending.
And it is well settled by numerous decisions, composing
the weight of authority, that an attorney may, in the
absence of express restriction, submit his clients cause
to arbitration. Arbitration being a recognized mode of
settling suits, these decisions are in accordance with
the correct view of an attorney's office.
When arbitrators are chosen by the parties, special
co fide)ce is plared i their discretion and ability, and
to allow them to delerate their responsibilities and du-
ties to others, would work ,i-iifest injustice. The rule
of delegRtus potestas non potest deleare, applies with
special force to this class of persons. Arbitrators,may,
however, obtain advice and information from a disinter-
ested person, whene -er it become3 necessary to enable
them in properly decidinrv a technical question which has
been sub itted to their judprfent.
A short space may broperly be devoted to a corsider-
ation of the general rule, as applied to factors, brokers,
executors,trustees and corporations.
A factor or broker has not the power to delegate his
authority to a clerk or suba-ent without the assent of
his principal.
The reason for :he rule in these merchantile a.-en-
cies is, that there is a trust and confidence placed in
the personal skill aid integrity of the person authorized
to act; the principal employs the broker or factor for tb
the simple reason of this skill. There is, however, a
relaxation of the rule, in the case of merchantile per-
sons, that a consignee or af ent to whom goods are sent
for the purpose of sale, may employ a broker to sell the
goods .
The principles which underlie the ieneral rule, are
of frequent application to the case of executors, trus-
tees, and other persons standin- ii a fiduciary relation.
The powers and duties of a trustee will not permit
him to give a g7eneral authority to another, unless ex-
press authority for that purpose is given in the instru-
ment creating the trust.
Perry on Trusts, 227.
A general power to an arent to sell and convey lands
belonging to the estate, or to contract absolutely for
the sale of such lands, cannot therefore be given by
trustees. But trustees may intrust an agent with an
authority to make conditional sales of land lying at a
distance from the place of residence of the trustees; and
subject to be ratified by them.
By the statute of Ne ,r York, a power given to two or
more persons must be exercised by them all.
8 Ed. R. S. p
The criterion by which to determine whether a power
contained in a devise or other instrument can or cannot
be executed by attorney is, "if a personal trust or con-
fidence is reposed in the donee of the power, requirin;
the exercise of his judgrrent, he car ot deiegate the ex-
ecution of such power; if otherwise, it may be dele;atod.
11herever a power is given ,rhether over real estate,
or personal rrorcerty, and .vI-Cethor the execution of it
will confer a leoal or only an equitable ric-bt on the
appointee, the test will apply.
Tn the case of Pearson v. Jareson, 1 7cLean 197, it
was held that notwithstanding the power was coupled with
an interest, it could not be delegated. The power in
question was given to an executor in the followin7 mahner,
'IT hereby five to him a fall and complete power and au-
thority to dispose of the real property in the best mode
he may find convenient or nay julre proper, etc."
One can see at a Flance that this power conferred
upon the executor required the exercise of his judgment
as to what was the "best mode", and by an application of'
the test, incapable of dele,-ation.
One of the ieadinE cases on this subjoct is that of
Ber,-er and Icrd v. Duff, 4 John. Chan. 369. Berger and
Icard, executors of the estate of one J. Icard, were au-
thorized to dell two lots of land, if the imperious cir-
cumstances of the times should in their best judgment
demand'. The plaintiff Icarcl left the country and soon
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after executed his power of attorney, authorizin, Berger
as co-executor to sell the land. The court said: "The
executor cannot sell by attorney; the power given to Ber-
ger and Icard was a trust and confidence reposed in them,
to be exercised jointly, according to their best judgment,
under circumstances contemplated in the will. One of
the executors in this case cannot commit his judr_-ment to
the other, any more than to a stranger, for, deleratus
non potest delegare."
The cases establishin7 this point are so numerous
that I have only given two of those which are the founda-
tions of our later decisions.
Muiciple and private corporations are also subject
to the rule of "poteatas delegata non potest delegare".,
As to public or municiple corporations,there has
been much discussion, and cases may be found in favor of
and cases agqainst, including them within the rule.
Legislative powers of a municiple corporation are
in the nature of a trust conferred upon the le~islative
body of the corporation; if discretion and judgment are
to be exercised, either as to time or manner, the body or
officer entrusted with the duty must exercise it.
In Budsall v. Clark 73 N.Y. 73, the charter of
11.
Bir':hampton provided that the building and maintainin of
sidewalks shall be done at the expense of the adjoinin-
premises. That when, after proper notice, the work was
not done within the time limited, The Council shouldr
cause the same to be performed by contract or otherwise.
The Council directed that in all such cases the' Superin-
tendent of Streets should cause the work to be done.
J. Church, in ritin'-, the opinion uses the following
languag"e: "The charter conferred the power upon the
Council to cause the work to be done by contract or
otherwise. This requires the exercise of judgment and
discretion as to the manner in which the work should be
done. Whose judgment and discretion wais to be exercisedo
The legislature has said that it was the judgrment and
discretion of the comnon council. x x x As to one work
it might be judicious and economical to direct that it
be done by contract and to let to the lowest bidder; in
another, entirely by days work, and even other terms and
directions might be appropriate."
This decision seems to be in accordance with the
weight of authority.
Where power is conferred upon a municiple corpora-
tion to regulate, by license or otherwise, any calling
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or business, they are powerless to dele,-ate a discretion-
ary authority to others.
Last St. Louis v. '.ehring, 50 Ill. 28.
Tn croatin- such bodies it is designod to aid the
;ov rn lent in the preservation of good order, and to pro-
tect persona in the particular community from injury and
annoyance, that cannot be so readilyi , :aurded against by
the general governinent of the state I Tn conferrin- the
power upon th:) corporate body, it - is intended that the
power shall be exercised by the body created, and in the
mode prescribed; and any departure from such authority,
or any attempt of the body to transfer their porter to
others is unwarranted.
A city, authorized by its charter to errect, repair
and regulate public wharves, and to fix the rate of
wharfage thereat, cannot lease its wharves and farm out
its revenues, or empo ;rer another tofix the rate of
wharfaT-e.
Matthe-rs v. City of Alexandria
38 Mo. 115.
Lord v. City of Aconto, 47 T'is. 386.
The legislature has, by virtue of the riht' of em-
inent domainor inherent sovereignty, the authority to
take private property for public purposes. Wh4]en the
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legislature delegates this power to a corporation, its
exercise is subject to the rile that the power must be
strictly pursmed.
State v. Jersey,City, 25 N.J.L.
The principle that muniiciple poibr camilot be dele-
-ated, does not prevent a corporation from appointing
agents and committees and investing them with duties of
a ministerial and mechanical character.
The general management and control of the affairs of
private corporations are entrusted to the board of direc-
tors.
The directors have, as will be seen under the cases
of implied authority, the right to employ the necessary
assistants to carry on the business of the company. But
those powers which it is intended should be exercised by
them personally can in no case be delegated.
Tt is upon the personal care and attention of the
directors that the shareholders depend for the success of
their enterprise; and by reason of this, there exists the
exercise of such a judgment and discretion as will make
the rule of "potestas delegata non potest deleg7are" apply.
Having to some extent considered the general rule,
the remainder of this article may properly be given to an
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examination of the exciptions of this rule.
There are certain cases in which an a,-ent may law-
fully appoint a suba,ont; these are divided into four
olasses; in each one of which the aent ha, prima facie
authiority to appoint a deputy.
1. When it becomes necessary to employ a suba-,ent
in order to carry out the ac-ency.
2. "hen the act to be performed is purely riinis-
t erial.
3. \henecer the a)7ent is allowed by a lawful usage
or custom of trade to appoint a deputy.
4. When it is understood by the parties to be the
method by which the object and purpose of the arter-y
would or might be attained.
Proceedi '- to the examination of these exceptions in
the order riven:
First. Y'iere it becomes necessary to employ a sub-
agent in order to carry out the agency.
This exception manifestly arises from the ordi'iary
interpretation of the contract of artency. The authority
of an agent is always construed to include all the nec-
essary and usual means of executing it properly.
It is clear that there are many cases where, from
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the very nature of the duty, or Vro ' the cirum< : .tances
under which it is to be perforiied, the employment of a
deputy or subarent is of the rreatest importance to pre-
vent injury to the principal's interests.
Havinv- nreiously seen that the rnanafraent and con-
trol of a private corporation is left to the board of
directors, and that such of their duties as require the
exercise of judgment and discretion cannot be delegated,
one ,ust not confuse these duties with those which, al-
though requirin- the exercise of skill and discretion,
ca2 ot be personally performed by the directors.
A frequent case of this kind is that of a railroad
, orpoi'ation where it is necessary for the purpose of
carrying on the business, to emplo- engineers, brakernea,
etc.,wlo have qualifications notu3ually possessed by the
directors.
Agents of a town appointed to iistitute legal pro-
ceedin's have the power-of delegation, so far as to em-
ploy attorneys to conduct the proceedings. One -an
plainly see that in such cases it is necessary for the
best interests o, the town, that the assistance of a per-
son acquainted with the ways of the courts, should be
procured.
16.
Bucklar),i v. Conway, 16 Mas'l. 296.
'Whee,r r a note sent to a b2K!c for collection, 'ust,
for the protection of tl> principal,be protested, the
ank h-3 inoplied authority to employ the proper officer.
Tn case a note or chec'! i. delivereJ to a bank to be
collected at a distant point, the autLority of the bank
to e.-ipoyr a subagent at that point and to send the note
or c eck to hil-,is implied.
The liability of the bank receiving the note has
been a matter of discussion; and involves a rule of' gen-
oral applic, tion. A rle affecting trade between dif -
ferent and distant places; and which in the absence of
statutory re~ulations, special contract or usage of trae, e
is not to be determined according to the interests of any
particular persons, or class of persons, but according to
those principles which will best promote the general
weifare of the commercial community. In performing the
duty of collection, as in all other acts, a bank having
no capacity to act for itself must depend upon the in-
strumentalities of agents. This proposition is the ba-
sis of the Massachusetts doctrine, established n~y the
case of Dorchester Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush. 177.
The court held that the liability of the bank receiving
17.
the note extends merely to the exercise of due care in
the selection of a competent agent and to transmit the
note to such agent. This case has been followed in
Connecticut, Maryland,Illinois, Wisconsin and Mississ-
ippi.
The authorities in these states rest on the ground
of necessity; and that the risk is on the person empoly-
ing the bank for the reason that he impliedly authorizes
the appointment of a subagent.
The contrary, that a bank receiving a draft for col-
lection, from a drawer residing in another state, is, in
the absence of any express or implied contract, liable fv
a neglect occuring in its collection, whether arising
from default of its own officers, of its correspondent in
the other state, or of an apent empolyed by such corres-
pondent.
Allen v. Merchants Bank, 26 Wend. 485, estab-
lished this doctrine in New York, and notwithstandinc, the
sharp criticism which it received in Dorchester Bank v.
Bank of New England, has been adopted by the United State
States court. Excbane Nat. Bank v. Third.!J;at. Bank, 112
1.3. 278., and by the courts of Pas, N.J., Ohio and Ind-
iana.
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The second exception is expressed as follors:
"When Lhe act to be performed is purely ministerial."
Certain powers arise by inference as incident to
others, and are essential to their exercise. Tn the
performance of a ceneral or sp.cial agency, many acts are
to be performed, of an indifferent nature, which may be
done by one person as well as by another, and which the
agent might find inconvenient to do personally. The
maiim iitholding the power of subdelegation, only applies
where the end or object to be gained might suffer injury
y such substitution. The agent havin' first determined
the propriety of the act may direct another to perform
the e"a Acal part.
Although the governing body of a rmuniciple corpora-
tion cannot delegate the powers requirinFr the exercise of
discretion, it ray appoint agents and comittees to dis-
ch-_rre duties which are merely ministerial or mechanical.
Edwards v. City of Watertown
61 How. Pr. 488.
This applies with equal force to the directors of
private corporations, who have power to employ various
inferior agents to take care of the details of the com-
pany's business.
19.
Where a power to sell land_; i8 given to an executor,
he has implied authority to employ a real estate dealer
to procure a purchaser.
Tn Norwich University v. Denny, 47 Vt. 9, it was
held that one having authority to sign the name of an-
other to a subscription paper, might procure a third per-
son to do so in his presence.
Also in Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill 501, a
general a'ent, having decided to accept two bills of ex-
change, directed a bookkeeper to do the rechanical part
of the act; the court held that there was no delegation
of authority to the book"keeper.
A question 11hich remained for a time in dispute, was
in rerrards to the power of an insurance agent to authorim
his clerks to contract for risks, etc. The leading case
of Bodine v. Insurance Co. 51 N.Y. 123, held that agents
had such power, and said: "Because as is well known they
could not transact their busina,-s if required to attend
to all the details in person#" The court seemed to in-
cline towards necessity instead of the rule under dis-
cussion. The cases which I have given will serve to
show the manner in which the rule has been applied.
Third Exception, permits an agent to appoint a depu-
20.
ty whenever there is a known and established custom or
usage of trade by which such an appointment is justified.
Parties contracting in relation to a subject matter, con-
cerning which there exists such a usage, may well be pre-
sumed to have it in contemplation. But a usage to be
good,must be reasonable,and for the benefit of trade
generally, and not for a particular class of individuals;
the usage must also be legal and consistent with the
terms of the contract.
Hence when a factor, being instructed to sell for
cash, allowed a purchaser- to take the goods away without
paying for them, he is liable for the goods and cannot
defend on the ground of a usage existing among factors,
which allowed purchasers a week to make their payments.
Bakersdale v. Brown, 9 Am. Dec. 720.
This case may be upheld on the further ground that
an agent cannot justify his acts in contravention to ex-
press instructions which he has received, on the ground
of usage or custom.
ere, however, goods were entrusted to a merchan-
dise broker to sell, not below a fixed price, and to de-
liver them and receive payment, and he deposited Lhem in
accordance with a usage with a commission merchant,
21.
taking his notes therefor; some of tlV. goods were after-
wards sold below the rgiven price. Jit was held that tlh
deposot boun-d the principal.
Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S..R. 386.
The liability of a bank receiving a note for collec-
tion has also been released on the ground of' usare and
cust ome.
A good authority upon this exception is the case of
Darling v. Slanwood, 14 Allen 504.
The fourth and last exception to the general rule of
-elegata potestas non potest delegare, exists where the
principal is aware that the agent will appoint a deputy.
If at the time of the creation of the agents authority
the appointment of a subagent vras contemplated by the
parties, or it was expected that a subagent might or
would be employed, the authority to make such an appoint-
ment will be implied.
As to the liability of the agent and subagent, it
may be said in eneral terms that, if an agent employs a
subagent, having authority, express or implied, to do so,
the latter is responsible directly to the principal for
his acts; but if damage results from these acts, the
agent is liable, only in case he has not exercised due
22.
care in the eloction of his subarent. But if the agent
merely to assist him in what he has undortaken to do,
employs a subagent, he does so at his own hazard, and no
privity of contract exists between the principal and sub-
agent. The agent is, therefore, responsible for the
manner in which The business is done, whether by himself
o bAT his servant, his agent.
